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Introduction 
Jim Cuthbert and Margaret Cuthbert’s most recent analysis 
of the UK’s utility businesses (see QEC Vol 31 No 3) seeks 
to challenge the fundamental price setting methodology 
adopted by utility regulators. The basis of the challenge 
arises from an estimate of the size of the apparent super 
normal profits being made by utility companies. From this 
they conclude that the resultant equity return is too high and 
so leaves customers paying prices that are too high for the 
services provided
1
. 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of their analysis cannot be 
faulted in general terms; the net present value (NPV) 
criterion for any investment is satisfied if revenues received 
are greater or equal to the interest cost on a company’s 
outstanding debt plus historic depreciation (assuming the 
company is funded 100% from debt). The Cuthberts argue 
that super normal profits are being generated because an 
element of revenue is based on an inflated depreciation 
charge rather than on historic cost depreciation, with the 
latter being sufficient to meet the simple NPV investment 
test. 
 
In this response I outline a number of reasons to challenge 
the notion that super normal profits are actually being 
generated within the UK water sector and so disagree that 
there is a need for fundamental change to the current price 
setting approach. 
 
1. Investment cycle 
The Cuthberts’ analysis is based on the assumption that 
utilities undertake annual investment programmes that are 
constant in real terms, so operating at some form of steady- 
state. It is hard to argue firms in the UK water sector are 
close to a steady state investment position given the size of 
the investment programmes currently facing them. For 
example, in the next 4 years Scottish Water is forecast to 
spend £2.45 billion (outturn prices)
2 
on capital investment, 
averaging over £610 million pa. This compares to a total 
investment for the 4 years 2002-06 of £1.8 billion (outturn 
prices) or just over £450 million pa
3
. Rather than facing an 
investment challenge that has now reached a steady-state, 
Scottish Water faces a large and growing investment 
commitment. 
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Should it be argued that this high level of investment is 
actually the norm and will therefore be a “steady-state” for 
the foreseeable future, the Cuthberts’ simple model rule is 
still open to challenge. A large investment commitment 
brings with it considerable delivery risk. For example, should 
the cost of the investment programme rise by only 10%, 
Scottish Water would need to raise an additional £245 
million to fund its programme, as it would have no reserves 
to draw on under the Cuthberts’ proposed approach. To put 
this into context, an additional £245 million equates to 1.4 
times the current annual debt support that is available from 
the Scottish Executive. It is not clear that the Cuthberts’ 
simple model allows for a risk premium to cover a wide 
variety of risks such as delivery risk. If, however, their model 
assumptions were relaxed to allow for a risk premium then 
this reduces or even eliminates the estimate of potential 
super normal profits. 
 
 
2. Ability to fund the investment programme The 
current price capping mechanism, developed by the 
economic regulators, sets prices that reflect both the 
depreciation cost of the non-infrastructure asset base as 
well as the cost of additions to the infrastructure. Whilst this 
approach ensures total revenues will be adequate over the 
life of an asset, it does not necessarily ensure cash required 
in any one year to procure new equipment is equal to the 
revenues accruing in that year. Scottish Water’s investment 
programme between 2006-10 is forecast to be around £2.45 
billion (outturn prices). The Scottish economic regulator’s 
(the Water Industry Commission for Scotland or the WICS) 
allowance for depreciation and infrastructure renewals over 
the same period amounts to around £1.25 billion
4 
(outturn 
prices). This leaves Scottish Water with a cash shortfall of 
£1.2 billion in this 4-year period, ie, its forecast revenues will 
not be sufficient to cover its capital investment programme. 
A pricing mechanism that does not permit the generation of 
a cash buffer leaves Scottish Water facing the need to raise 
more debt (which is limited to whatever the Scottish 
Executive is prepared or able to lend), increase charges 
(thus breaching Ministerial targets), or delay investment 
(which would have a detrimental impact on the efficiency of 
the Scottish economy). 
 
A price-capping mechanism that passes the Cutberts’ 
simple NPV test is therefore a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to ensure investment opportunities are fundable. 
Any price capping methodology must be sufficiently flexible 
to ensure a large investment programme undertaken over 
many years can be funded and that there is no cashflow 
mismatch, assuming management is operating efficiently. 
 
3. Likelihood of undertaking inappropriate 
investment 
The Cuthberts argue that the current price setting 
mechanism provides incentives for management to enter 
into perverse investment decisions leaving customers 
paying more than is necessary for their water services. 
Prices will increase once capital investment is completed via 
an increase in the return to equity. The risks the Cuthberts 
see is that with such an outcome management will be 
encouraged to undertake unnecessary investment knowing 
prices will rise to pay for it. Whilst it is possible to imagine 
some investment could be undertaken simply to boost 
overall returns, there are substantial checks within the 
system that would suggest the likelihood of such action is 
low or nil. 
 
The WICS and OFWAT (the economic regulator for English 
and Welsh water companies) set tough output targets for 
the water utilities in the UK. Any attempt to undertake 
investment that simply targets a higher return on capital with 
no link to achieving output targets would seem 
counterproductive. Inefficiencies will ultimately show up in 
annual returns damaging reputational risk and leaving the 
guilty company open to financial penalties. 
 
Failing this sanction, the regulator could limit the amount of 
the investment that is to be added to the asset base. 
Indeed, in its recent price review in Scotland the WICS 
made it clear they would only permit efficient investment to 
be added. 
 
“Providing capital expenditure has been justifiably 
incurred in order to provide services to customers, 
then it is reasonable that customers should 
remunerate this investment in the RCV [regulatory 
capital value].   ……. In the Strategic Review of 
Charges we have set the level of efficient new 
investment and the appropriate depreciation 
charge. We would adjust the RCV before the next 
regulatory control period to reflect any extra or 
inefficient investment.”
5
 
 
If the RCV is not increased regulated businesses face 
longer-term problems. They would have insufficient 
revenues to carryout their investment obligations leaving 
them with the problem of needing additional equity or 
increases in borrowings. On either account this would most 
likely lead to an increase in their debt costs and/or a 
reduction in the return on equity. 
 
Whilst this system of checks and balances may not stop 
maverick management in the short term, the long-term 
nature of the regulatory and funding arrangements that 
characterises the industry will limit any serious or long-term 
tendencies to support inefficient investment. Critical to the 
success of this current system is the ability and willingness 
of the economic regulator to set appropriately incentivised 
targets combined with suitable sanctions should 
management operate inappropriately. 
 
4. Indexation of capital base 
The current price capping formula allows the RCV to be kept 
constant in real prices, ie, it is increased by inflation. This 
results in the depreciation charge in the pricing mechanism 
being based on a current cost value which ensures 
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consumer charges rise steadily with inflation over the asset 
life and not ratchet-up as the cost base rises following 
additions to capital stock. 
 
The Cuthberts  favour an alternative approach whereby the 
RCV is valued at its historic cost.
6 
This means a lower 
depreciation charge is applied so lowering customer 
charges in the short-term, ceteris paribus. However, new 
equipment ultimately replaces broken or fully depreciated 
assets and the RCV base will then be re-valued on a current 
price base. Under an historic cost basis consumers face the 
possibility of substantial increases in prices should the cost 
base rise substantially. It is not self evident that the 
Cuthberts’ approach is necessarily fairer to the consumer as 
some may prefer price certainty which gradual upward 
movement offers compared to irregular increases reflecting 
an erratically revalued cost base. 
 
The Cuthberts’ approach would have the potential to limit 
dividend distributions
7
, though even that cannot be 
guaranteed. A potentially more effective way of limiting the 
distribution of dividends is through the need for 
management to meet strict financial ratios set by funders (or 
by the regulator in the case of Scottish Water). These ratios 
would be set relative to whether the depreciation charge 
was on an historic or current cost basis. Before a dividend 
could be paid out management would have to reach a 
higher minimum level for all financial ratios if the forecast 
revenue stream is based on a current and not an historic 
cost basis. 
 
5. Sufficient returns to equity 
Prices are also a function of the returns required by equity 
as the price cap mechanism allows investors to be rewarded 
for their capital at risk. The Cuthberts argue strongly that the 
rate of return received by water companies is too high and 
that consumers are not being adequately compensated for 
their “hidden” contribution namely the cash buffer. Far from 
being “hidden”, the cash buffer generated by the current 
pricing approach will have been explicitly taken into account 
by those who injected equity to help them decide how much 
was sensible to invest given the forecast level of return. To 
see the cash buffer as not being part of the equity 
calculation could lead to insufficient third party equity being 
made available with the knock-on effect of limiting the 
amount of capital investment that might be possible. 
 
It would be hard to defend the dividend distribution policy of 
many in the industry in the years immediately after 
privatisation. With little or no precedence in how to launch 
and regulate a new sector of business and one that was 
(and continues to be) extremely capital hungry, it was 
always likely that equity was going to be well rewarded. 
However, in its draft determination for its 2000-05 review 
OFWAT illustrates how post tax rates of return have fallen 
steadily since the early 1990s, and then set price caps 
aimed at allowing even lower equity returns for the sector for 
the period to 2005. Whilst some of the reduction in returns 
to equity reflects the lowering of real interest rates over the 
period, it also reflects the markets’ growing confidence in 
the sector both as a lender as well as an owner of its equity. 
 
Regulators continue to question what is an acceptable rate 
of return for this type of business. For Scottish Water in 
particular, the acceptable rate needs to reflect the reality 
that it is operating without a cash buffer, is implementing a 
capital programme unprecedented in recent times which 
carries severe cost over-run risk or, more likely, the risk of 
having to pay penalties for under-delivery of environmental 
improvements along with an ever present risk of asset and 
systems failure. 
 
Conclusion 
The regulator’s periodic review of prices in Scotland’s water 
and sewerage sector is now underway, setting price caps for 
the industry to 2014. Such a review is essential where a 
competitive market price cannot be determined and must be 
rigorous enough to guard against the generation of 
monopoly profits. Whilst offering no solution to the perceived 
problem, the Cuthberts accept that moving totally to a 
historic cost price capping mechanism would be a step too 
far. The above analysis suggests that substantial changes 
would be unwarranted and, at this stage in its development, 
the current framework for reviewing price caps remains fit- 
for-purpose. 
 
Jo Armstrong 
May 2007 
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